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Research in context
Evidence before this study

ev

Lack of access to patented medicines in low- and middle-income countries is a well-known issue,
including antibacterials. Prior to this study, it was known that antibacterials suffered a broken business
model due to inability to recoup sunk research and development with limited sales of new drugs despite
the need to have antibacterials ready for future preparedness. Prior studies measured time lag to
availability using marketing approval dates, not commercial launch dates. In this study, we evaluated all
antibacterials approved in fourteen high-income markets for the decade beginning January 1, 2010, to
determine the delay in both approvals and commercial launches.

Added value of this study
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Including commercial launch as well as marketing approval demonstrates that patients in high-income
countries experience much longer waits for new antibacterials than previously understood. Commercial
decisions driven by low reimbursement for antibacterials are more salient than regulatory approval lag.
All but one antibacterial was placed on the WHO “Reserve” list, indicating stronger stewardship
measures. Commercial launch lags affected “innovative” antibiotics as well, yielding sales in the context
of antimicrobial stewardship which are too low to sustain research and development going forward.
Commercial launch lags were not associated with other hypothesized factors such as national levels of
drug resistance and national health spending. Sponsors of new antibacterials are suffering economically,
with bankruptcies, low market capitalizations, and low sales revenues.
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Implications of all the available evidence
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Antibacterial reimbursement must be reformed in high-income countries, consistent with appropriate
stewardship. Paying for antibiotics based on their preparedness value as infrastructure, delinked from
sales volume, may be the best path to sustain innovation, stewardship, and global access.
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Abstract (max 300 words)

Background: Inaccessibility of patented medicines in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) is a
frequent challenge. Yet it is typically assumed that high-income countries have complete access to the
full arsenal of medicines. This study tests this assumption for patented antibacterials, a class widely
acknowledged as having a broken business model. New antibiotics are saved as a last resort in order to
prevent the development of resistance, resulting in insufficient revenues to offset costs.
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Methods: We identified all antibacterials approved in Canada, Europe, Japan, and the USA for the
decade beginning January 1, 2010 and evaluated differences in marketing authorizations and
commercial launches in fourteen high-income countries. Delays in access were described as launch lags
– the time in days between approvals and commercial launch. Associations between several factors
including “innovativeness” were explored.

pe

er
r

Findings: Eighteen new antibacterials were identified. The majority were accessible in the US (n=17,
94%), the United Kingdom (n=11, 61%), and Sweden (n=10, 56%), with the remaining eleven countries
having access to less than half of them. European marketing authorization did not lead to widespread
European access, as fourteen of the antibacterials were approved by EMA, but many fewer were
commercially launched. Five antibacterials were deemed as “innovative”, but there was no significant
difference in access between “innovative” and “non-innovative” antibacterials. Surprisingly,
antibacterials not listed on the EML had shorter launch lags. Japan had the longest median launch lags.
Canada had the fewest drugs commercially available (n=2, 11%).
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Interpretation: Patient access to new antibacterials is limited not just in LMICs, as previously reported,
but also in high-income countries such as Canada, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. The major
driver of delayed access appears to be poor commercial prospects for reimbursement, leading to
company decisions to delay or forego commercialization in many high-income countries due to
expectations of insufficient profitability.

Introduction

tn

Funding: No funding received

rin

Innovative medicines are often unavailable in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) for a decade or
more after introduction in high-income countries.1 Once available, the medicines may still be
inaccessible given lack of effective healthcare insurance protections or access to affordable care.2
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These concerns are also recognized within antibacterials,3 where stewardship adds additional
complexity. The more a given antibacterial is used, the greater the selection pressure to develop
resistance.4 This characteristic, combined with the paucity of novel antibacterial candidates in clinical
development, gives a strong incentive to steward novel antibacterials to be used only as a last resort.
Since revenues of novel drugs are driven by unit sales, antibacterial innovators struggle to achieve
profitability, with large companies exiting the market and small companies going bankrupt. As these
programs struggle to survive, they reduce their expenses by limiting introduction of new antibacterials
to markets where sales are expected to exceed regulatory and other additional costs.
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In 2010, the Infectious Diseases Society of America called for ten new antibiotics by 2020.5 This goal was
achieved in terms of the number of drug approvals, but actual patient access requires commercial
launches in many countries, which itself requires sustainable commercial markets. Prior work has
described limited access to new antibacterials in LMICs, in part due to the inability of many to afford
these drugs.3 This study examines patient access for new antibacterials in fourteen high-income
countries, to better understand other barriers to patient access to effective antibacterial therapy.

Data and methods
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We included all new molecular entity (NME) antibiotics (drugs with a J01 classification from the
Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification maintained by the World Health Organization) that
were approved by either the United States Food & Drug Administration (FDA), the European Medicines
Agency (EMA), Health Canada, or the Japanese Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency (PMDA) for
the decade from 1 January 2010 until 31 December 2019. We also included fidaxomicin, classified as an
A07 antidiarrheal drug for the treatment of Clostridioides difficile-associated infection (CDI), and
bezlotoxumab, classified as J06 for recurrent CDI, which is generally associated with prior antibiotic use.
We excluded generics, topical drugs, drugs with other ATC classifications, and combination drugs
without any NME component.
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For each such drug (referred to hereinafter as an “antibacterial”), we recorded the date of FDA, EMA,
Health Canada, or PMDA approval, International Nonproprietary Name (INN), brand name, current
sponsor, route of administration, and various regulatory designations in the countries studied. This
information was collected as of 31 December 2020 from government websites (see the Supplemental
Materials) as well as filings with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and
company press releases. Sponsors are categorized as “large” if they employ 250 or more full-time
equivalent employees; otherwise, “small or medium enterprises” or “SMEs.”
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We collected commercial launch (first commercial sale) dates in the following fourteen high-income
countries: Canada, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Norway, Romania, Spain,
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Date of commercial launch in each country was
obtained from the sponsor. If sponsor data was not available, the earliest reported commercial launch
date from public or commercial databases was used instead.
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We collected possible indicators of drug quality. From the World Health Organization, we determined
whether each drug was on the Essential Medicines List (EML) and its placement on the “Access, Watch,
and Reserve” (AWaRe) list of antibacterials.6,7 We also used the assessments of innovation from the
WHO Antibacterial Agents in Clinical Development reports.8,9 From the Pew Charitable Trusts, we
determined whether the antibacterial was considered by Pew to be innovative.10 Both Sweden and
National Health England are piloting post-approval incentives for antibacterials, so we tracked which
drugs have been selected as of 31 December 2020.
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Sales data in the United States for the trailing 12-month period ending June 2020 were obtained from
Needham & Co. analyst Alan Carr.11 Sponsors were noted if, subsequent to first regulatory approval,
they filed for bankruptcy in their country of domicile or, if publicly traded, had market capitalization
lower than $300M. For the full data set and additional methods, see the Supplementary Materials.
We analyzed the data using comparative descriptive and inferential statistics. We calculated median
launch lags by country (including EMA as a country for this purpose) and drug. Launch lag is the time
from first regulatory approval in the US, EU, Japan or Canada to the date of commercial launch in a given
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country. For second and subsequent regulatory approvals, we calculated the time from approval in the
first country (generally, the United States) to the date of approval and, separately, commercial launch in
the studied country. For antibacterials not yet approved or commercially launched in any of the other
studied countries, we reported the time from first regulatory approval to the study end date of
December 31, 2020, as “lag to date”.

ev

To examine median launch lag between innovative and non-innovative drugs among the eleven
antibacterials launched in two or more countries in our sample, we tested the difference in median
launch lag for statistical significance using the Related-Samples Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Antibacterials
were defined as “innovative” if designated as “innovative” or “possibly innovative” by WHO or as
“novel” by the Pew Charitable Trusts. The same analysis was performed for drugs on the EML, as a proxy
for global clinical need, and difference in median launch lag between listing and non-listing in the EML
was assessed for significance. We also tested the difference in median launch lag by sponsor
characteristics, proxied by SME status using the Wilcoxon test.
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To assess how the burden of drug resistance, as a determinant of demand in countries, is associated
with median launch lags, we performed a bivariate correlation using Spearman’s rho (rs), with p=0.01 (2tailed) for all fourteen countries. The burden was proxied by the Drug Resistance Index (DRI).12 For Japan
with no data in the DRI, we used the values in the dataset from Sweden, given Japan’s relative success
against drug resistance.13 We also assessed correlation between median launch lag outside the US and
the 12-month trailing sales in the US for antibacterials with multiple launches by Spearman’s rho.

pe

Results

Eighteen antibacterials met the inclusion criteria (sixteen J01 antibiotics and two products for CDI,
bezlotoxumab and fidaxomicin) as shown in Table 1.
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In all but one of the countries studied, the majority of the drugs have not been commercially launched
as of 31 December 2020 (Table 1): Canada (n=2, 11%); Japan, Denmark, and Croatia (n=5 launched,
28%); Romania and Greece (n=6, 33%); Spain, Norway, Italy, and Germany (n=7, 39%); and France (n=8,
44%). Only in Sweden (n=10, 56%), the United Kingdom (n=11, 61%), and the United States (n=17, 94%)
have the sponsors launched a majority of these drugs. In Canada, only two of the five approved drugs
are commercially launched. Only four antibacterials are commercially launched in all European countries
studied. Only two antibacterials (fidaxomicin and ceftolozane/tazobactam) have been commercially
launched in all fourteen high-income countries studied. They were first approved in 2011 and 2014 and
are marketed by large companies. Median launch lags are presented in Figure 1.
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Granting of marketing authorization did not necessarily lead to commercial launch, as can be seen
clearly in Canada and the five largest drug markets in Europe, where much of the launch lag has
occurred after regulatory approval for the drug. (Figure 2) The sponsor for lascufloxacin has not yet filed
for regulatory approval with the FDA, Health Canada, or EMA. For two of the four antibacterials lacking
EMA approval (plazomicin and omadacycline), pending EMA market authorization approvals were
voluntarily rescinded by the sponsors due to poor economic prospects for sales in Europe. The sponsor
of plazomicin (Cipla Europe NV, successor to Achaogen after the bankruptcy sale) cited the cost of the
required approval and post-approval work making the product “financially and commercially unviable
with the limited indication that was to be accepted.”14 For omadacycline, the sponsor (Paratek Ireland
Limited) was similarly pragmatic: “The insistence for a second CAP [community acquired pneumonia]
study to support approval for this indication in EU has significantly changed the value proposition” and
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therefore “all partner discussions have now been discontinued.”15 Paratek predicted that European
patient access to omadacycline would be delayed by five years.

ev

In total, five antibacterials were deemed “innovative”: (lefamulin and meropenem/vaborbactam by both
WHO and Pew; ceftazidime/avibactam by Pew and predating the WHO reports; bezlotoxumab by WHO
but not evaluated by Pew; and cefiderocol, described below).10 Lefamulin was approved by Health
Canada on 16 July 2020 and by EMA on 27 July 2020, but has not launched outside the United States.
Meropenem/vaborbactam was approved and launched in the US in 2017, and despite being approved
by the EMA in 2018, it is only available in three of the other studied countries. Ceftazidime/avibactam
was approved and launched in the US in 2015, approved by the EMA in 2016, and is available in all but
two of our select countries (Canada and Japan). Bezlotoxumab was approved and launched in the US in
2016, approved by the EMA in 2017, and is not available in five of the high-income countries studied
(Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Greece, and Romania).
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Cefiderocol, assessed as “possibly innovative” by WHO, is one of the few new antibiotics active against
the metallo-β-lactamases (NDM, IMP, etc.) that make bacteria resistant to carbapenems. Cefiderocol
was approved by EMA on 23 April 2020 but was not launched anywhere in Europe as of 31 December
2020 (note that cefiderocol was commercially launched in Sweden as part of their pilot program on
January 1, 2021, the day after the end of this study period, so we coded it as launched in Sweden).
Cefiderocol has not been approved in either Canada or Japan. Comparing the four “innovative” and
“possibly innovative” antibacterials with multiple launches (excepting lefamulin, launched only in the
US) with the others, we found that there was no significant difference in median launch lags, p=0.465,
among all eleven antibacterials with launches in more than one country.

ot

Eight of the drugs are on the 2020 WHO EML (ceftaroline, delafloxacin, ceftolozane/tazobactam,
omadacycline, eravacycline, plazomicin, meropenem/vaborbactam, and ceftazidime/avibactam).6
Eravacycline, omadacycline, and plazomicin are not launched in any of the countries studied other than
the United States. Delafloxacin is launched in two of the countries studied (United Kingdom, and United
States). Ceftaroline is launched in twelve of the countries studied (United States, plus all of the
European countries studied, but not Canada or Japan).

rin

tn

Of the eleven antibacterials with launches in more than one country, we found a significant difference in
median launch lag, p=0.043, between listing and non-listing on the EML. Unexpectedly, such multiplelaunch antibacterials listed on the EML had longer median launch lags. The five multiple-launch EML
drugs (ceftaroline, meropenem/ vaborbactam, ceftazidime/avibactam, ceftolozane/tazobactam,
delafloxacin) had a median launch lag of 780 days, compared to 414 days for the six non-listed multiplelaunch drugs (fidaxomicin, dalbavancin, tedizolid, imipenem/cilastatin/relabactam, cefiderocol and
bezlotoxumab).
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Seven of the eighteen drugs (39%) were sponsored by SMEs, accounting for six of the eleven drugs
(55%) approved by the FDA since 1 January 2016. Drugs sponsored by SMEs are being launched more
slowly in Europe, Canada, and Japan. Five of the seven SME drugs have not been launched outside the
United States. The other two SME drugs (delafloxacin and meropenem/vaborbactam) have only been
launched in the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and Sweden (meropenem/vaborbactam
only for France and Sweden). The median launch lag for SME and large company drugs was 510 days
(seventeen months) and 420 days (fourteen months), respectively. There was no significant difference in
launch delay by SME status, p=0.180.

Page 6 of 16
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3825520

iew
ed

There was no statistically significant relationship between the burden of drug resistance and median
launch lag. The results suggested a very weak negative but statistically not significant correlation
between DRI and median launch lag (rs = -0.033, n = 13, p = 0.915).
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Additional results are described in the Supplemental Materials.
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None of the above-mentioned antibacterials have been commercially successful by ordinary drug
development standards (Figure 3). In the United States, commercial sales for all but three of these drugs
(ceftazidime/avibactam, fidaxomicin, and ceftaroline) are below $100 million for the most recent 12month trailing period, and none of the eighteen drugs exceeded $150 million in sales despite having
been on the US market for up to ten years (ceftaroline). The last twelve months sales in the first
approval market for all eighteen drugs is a median of $16.2 million and a cumulative sum of $714.3
million. Sponsors for four drugs filed for bankruptcy after first regulatory approval, and sponsors for
three other drugs had market capitalizations less than $300 million. There was also no statistically
significant correlation between US 12-month trailing sales and median launch lag outside the US (rs =
0.297, n = 10, p = 0.405).

Discussion
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While the innovation crisis in antibiotics is well-known,16-18 we describe serious limitations on
commercial launch and therefore patient access in high-income countries. Most new antibacterials
approved by the FDA, EMA, PMDA, or Health Canada since 1 January 2010 are not commercially
available to patients in many high-income countries due to a combination of delayed marketing
authorization submission/approval and delayed commercial launch even after marketing approval.
Given the long commercial launch lags in many European countries despite EMA authorization, and in
Canada, after Health Canada authorization, regulatory approval is clearly not the only barrier. The major
driver of delayed access appears to be poor commercial prospects for reimbursement, leading to
company decisions to delay or forego commercialization in many high-income countries due to
expectations of insufficient profitability.
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Antibacterials are generally approved based upon non-inferiority clinical trial designs, meaning that the
new drug is shown not to be inferior to a comparator, typically an older generic antibacterial.19 In many
European countries, this trial design automatically adjusts the reimbursement amount to the same
amount as the comparator drug. Even if a new antibacterial demonstrates improved efficacy after
commercialization, it is difficult to have the unit price increased. Knowing this, companies take these
regulations into consideration when determining their commercialization strategies. Other constraints
on revenues include payment for hospital antibiotics through diagnostic related groups (which do not
account for higher priced antibacterials),20 governments requiring significant price reductions,21 and the
impact of stewardship, which lowers sales volumes. For the two sponsors that withdrew marketing
applications from EMA, costs from required approval and post-approval work outweighed the limited
prospects for net revenues.

Pr

Commercial drug innovation is supported by sales during the patent term.22 For antibacterials, sales in
the United States are currently insufficient to sustain innovation.16-18,23,24 Delayed or abandoned
commercial launches in other high-income countries result in a large share of the patent term outside of
the United States yielding little or no revenues. Even within the first launch market of choice (the United
States for seventeen of eighteen drugs, 94%), the trailing 12-month sales for the entire sector were low:
a cumulative sum of $714.3 million, which means that the entire antibacterial branded market – all
antibacterials approved for the decade beginning 1 January 2010 – was valued at less than a single
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blockbuster drug. Mean sales of $16.2 million are insufficient to cover ongoing commercialization costs,
including manufacturing, regulatory, medical affairs, and post-approval commitments, with no
opportunity to recover sunk R&D costs. This economic situation explains why sponsors for seven of the
eighteen products suffered either bankruptcy or market capitalizations below the sunk cost of R&D, with
the bulk of this economic damage coming since April 2019. Relative sales success in the United States
did not predict commercial launch in the other high-income countries studied, suggesting that these
markets are segmented by national characteristics driving commercial prospect for sales, but these
national characteristics do not include the level of drug resistance, measured by the DRI, or national
health expenditures (data in Supplemental Materials).
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For all of these drugs, careful stewardship may be a cause of lower sales. For the antibacterials
categorized on the WHO AWaRe list, all but one was placed on the most restrictive “Reserve” category,
essentially saving the drug for future patients. While a laudable public health imperative, the economic
impact on the companies is clearly apparent. In light of modern stewardship practices,7,25,26 it is very
difficult for companies selling newly launched Reserve antibacterials to earn sufficient revenues from
volume of sales alone.
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An alternative explanation for low sales and delayed launches could be inadequate antibacterial
innovation in the past decade, with these drugs selling poorly because they simply are not clinically
important drugs. But we find poor sales and delayed patient access even for the antibacterials labeled as
novel by the Pew Charitable Trusts or innovative by the WHO, as well as those placed on the Essential
Medicines List by the WHO.
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Canada and Japan present interesting case studies in the data. Both are significant markets for
consumer goods, but they trail all other high-income countries studied for commercial launches of
antibacterials, at rates far exceeding prior studies of Canadian and Japanese drug lags. Japan was
traditionally a strong launch market for antibiotics,27,28 with significant leadership from Japanese
companies. For example, data from 1999-2007 found that the Japanese lag for anti-infectives was only
13.6 months.27 Canadian data from 2000-2011 reported much shorter lags than what we report here.28
A number of smaller and less wealthy European countries have seen greater numbers of commercial
antibacterial launches than Canada and Japan. Plausible explanations include the consolidated
marketing approval process through the EMA, as compared to the need to separately apply to Health
Canada and the Japanese PMDA, and the need for additional clinical studies in Japan.27,28 With Brexit on
31 December 2020, there is an opportunity to study the future impact of the new process for marketing
approvals in the United Kingdom.
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Sweden has also launched a program to encourage companies to commercially launch antibacterials in
Sweden,29 this program has already led to three new commercial launches in Sweden (cefiderocol,
imipenem-cilastatin/relabactam, and meropenem/vaborbactam). This single program has moved
Sweden from seven to ten launched drugs, moving to sole possession of third place in the high-income
countries studied, behind only the Unites States and the United Kingdom. Sweden’s program is
therefore a highly successful access initiative. Sweden’s program is explicitly not an innovation incentive,
i.e., it is not attempting to provide a return on investment for the R&D costs of new antibacterials. It
guarantees annual revenues of approximately US$400,000 per drug to enhance patient access in
Sweden. The program’s design is elegant in its simplicity and could be scaled up to also provide an
innovation incentive proportional to Sweden’s economic stature, or indeed any other country so
inclined. The UK pilot, subscribing for two innovative drugs (ceftazidime/avibactam and cefiderocol), is
explicitly designed as an innovation incentive.30
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Fundamentally, the core challenge is that the fruit of a decade of antibacterial innovation has little
financial value today if value is driven only by the frequency of current use, and obviously clinical impact
is absent for patients in countries where the product is not commercially available. To address this,
reimbursement must begin to recognize the preparedness value of having antibacterials on hand before
they are needed. Preparedness value can be thought of as analogous to the value of having a fire
extinguisher or entire fire department:31 benefits of novel antibacterials can then be seen based on the
“STEDI” attributes of Spectrum of coverage, Transmission interruption, Enablement of medical care,
Diversity of antibiotic choice, and Insurance against pandemic spread.32,33
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As the preparedness value is most fundamentally a function of offering novel utility, we also must reorient the R&D community towards the higher risk but higher preparedness value of truly novel
antibacterials and hence more clinically important drugs. Intrinsically useful properties can be defined
well in advance of registration31 and delinked pull approaches such as the PASTEUR Act and the UK
antibiotic pilot propose rewards scaled to demonstration of high-value attributes.30,34 We anticipate the
European Union will fulfil its commitment to create a delinked antibiotic pilot in 2021.35

While this study did not assess the commercialization of new antibacterials in LMICs, our findings do not
bode well for these countries, given low profitability expectations.3 Delinked pull incentives may be
required to persuade sponsors to serve these markets, even on a non-profit basis.
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In conclusion, patient access to new antibacterials is limited, not just in LMICs, as previously reported,
but also in high-income countries such as Canada, Japan, and many European countries. Companies
appear to eschew antibacterial markets not offering attractive commercial prospects, which are almost
all markets currently. If truly innovative antibacterials, like those identified by WHO and Pew, cannot
find profitable markets, antibacterial innovation is in serious jeopardy, which reinforces calls for new
economic incentives, delinked from unit sales.
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Table 1. Approval and commercial launch in fourteen high-income countries of NME antibacterials first approved by FDA, EMA, PMDA, or Health
Canada, 2010-2019.
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Figures

Figure 1: Median launch lags (MLL), in days, in fourteen high-income countries for NME antibacterials first approved by FDA, EMA, PMDA, or
Health Canada, 2010-2019
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Figure 2. Delay in days before and after EMA approval for recently-approved antibiotics, in five high-income European countries
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Figure 3: US trailing 12-month sales for antibacterials approved 2010-2019, by launch date, sponsor size, and number of high-income country
commercial launches, with linear trend
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